INTRODUCTION
The world over, what political cause is celebrated more than human rights? The rule of law, perhaps. These two noble and important objects of civil government-both valued as of inestimable worth these daysusually are complementary. Human rights are insecure without the rule of law to protect them, and what human right is more fundamental than the right to be treated in accordance with the law and not the whim of the mighty? Human rights and the rule of law seem to stand together. How then, when human rights and the rule of law stand opposed, and in circumstances where they most need each other's mutual support and meet opposition enough from other forces?
It is the thesis of this article that in East Africa human rights and the rule of law very likely stand opposed and cannot coexist. To be sure, some human rights can coexist with some notion of the rule of law in East Africa, as elsewhere. But for East Africa to play host to the full panoply of human rights as commonly supported by the international community and endorsed by East African nations themselves, and at the same time to play host to a rigorous practice of the rule of law, appears to be something that simply cannot be done.
The argument of this article is straightforward. Part I describes the rule of law, its importance, and (briefly) its treatment in East Africa. Part II describes human rights, their two major divisions, and (briefly) their treatment in East Africa. Part III explains how the rule of law and human rights collide in East Africa. The conclusion suggests that this collision is the result of an extravagant Western imperialism that has helped deprive East Africa both of human rights and of the rule of law.
I. THE RULE OF LAW AND EAST AFRICA
The rule of law is today more talked about in more places by more people than perhaps ever in its history, but that does not mean it is any clearer in meaning or significance, or better understood. Indeed, the term has been put to so many uses in recent years that it is difficult to see how anyone will ever be able plausibly to claim to have cornered the market. At the outset of the twenty-first century, the rule of law is no longer a concept exclusively, or even primarily, defined and debated by political philosophers and constitutional lawyers, as had been the case in centuries past. Over the last decade [i.e., approximately the first of the third millennium] in particular, the rule of law has become "the motherhood and apple pie of development economics." Western democracies, their regional organizations, NGOs, and the multilateral development agencies they control, now pour billions of dollars and euros into projects designed to measure the rule of law, create it where it does not exist-in closed dictatorships, failed states, and post-conflict zones-and to strengthen it in traditional and struggling democracies around the globe. Institutionalists of different hews [sic] have come to see it as central to modern statehood, impartial economic exchange, and objective justice. Democracy scholars are pointing to it as the essential, non-electoral dimension of democratic substance. Together with human rights and democracy, the rule of law is now upheld by liberal internationalists as a central pillar in the "virtuous trilogy" upon which a legitimate international order rests, while international 48
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[Vol. 24.1 will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. Though this ideal can never be perfectly achieved, since legislators as well as those to whom the administration of the law is entrusted are fallible men, the essential point, that the discretion left to the executive organs wielding coercive power should be reduced as much as possible, is clear enough. While every law restricts individual freedom to some extent by altering the means which people may use in the pursuit of their aims, under the Rule of Law the government is prevented from stultifying individual efforts by ad hoc action. Within the known rules of the game the individual is free to pursue his personal ends and desires, certain that the powers of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate his efforts.
5
Hayek's definition of the rule of law is formal in that it prescribes how law should operate generally rather than prescribing any particular content of the law. It is the certainty, stability, and notoriety of the law that matters, not the merit or justice of its requirements. 6 Slightly enlarging Hayek's definition, though still squarely within the formal division of definitions of the rule of law, is one from Brian Tamanaha: 6. The author is reminded of a conversation he enjoyed over a picnic lunch with Malcolm Muggeridge and a few others during which Muggeridge impishly remarked that he had rather be governed by Joseph Stalin than by Eleanor Roosevelt because under Stalin one at least knew where one stood.
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The rule of law means that government officials and citizens are bound by and abide by the law.
. . . . This definition requires that there must be a system of laws-and law by its nature involves rules set forth in advance that are stated in general terms. A particular decision or an order made for an occasion is not a rule. The law must be generally known and understood. The requirements imposed by the law cannot be impossible for people to meet. The laws must be applied equally to everyone according to their terms. There must be mechanisms or institutions that enforce the legal rules when they are breached. 7 Tamanaha makes explicit what surely must be implicit in Hayek's definition of the rule of law: The laws must speak in general terms, be applied to all generally, and be such that they can be obeyed. What he adds to these is the element of enforcement. The rule of law requires that the law in fact rule. Other similar definitions mention the role of courts in applying the law. 8 At least one definition, attempting to describe what the rule of law means in the American context, includes the notion that persons aggrieved by certain government decisions have the opportunity to state their cases before independent decision makers whose decisions are to be well justified. 9 All these definitions of the rule of law share the formal approach. General, prospective, publicized rules are to regulate the relations between civil government and others, whatever the content of those rules.
Contrast such a formal understanding of the rule of law with a substantive understanding that brings within its ambit some constraint on The rule of law can be defined as a system in which the laws are public knowledge, are clear in meaning, and apply equally to everyone. They enshrine and uphold the political and civil liberties that have gained status as universal human rights over the last half-century. In particular, anyone accused of crime has the right to a fair, prompt hearing and is presumed innocent until proved guilty. The central institutions of the legal system, including courts, prosecutors, and police, are reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. Judges are impartial and independent, not subject to political influence or manipulation. Perhaps most important, the government is embedded in a comprehensive legal framework, its officials accept that the law will be applied to their own conduct, and the government seeks to be lawabiding.
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Observe that the italicized sentence takes the definition of the rule of law beyond the formal to include the general protection of human rights. It is said that most scholarly definitions of the rule of law embrace such substantive elements, with those in the field of foreign-policy embracing human rights specifically. 11 The maximalist substantive versions of the rule of law remind one of the second of Aristotle's descriptions 12 :
The rule of law signifies "the empire of laws and not of men": the subordination of arbitrary power and the will of public officials as much as possible to the guidance of laws made and enforced to serve their proper purpose, which is the public good ("res publica") of the community as a whole. When positive laws or their interpretation or enforcement serve other purposes, there is no rule of law, in its fullest 
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sense, but rather "rule by law"-mere legalism-in service of arbitrary power. 13 Similar is the notion that the rule of law requires the positive law to align with the natural law. As Harold Berman explained, "The Rechtsstaat was to govern by law and was to be bound by, and not absolved from, the law which it made." 14 But "Rechtsstaat . . . is rule by law, not rule of law; it does not presuppose a fundamental law which is derived from a source outside the state and which the state is legally powerless to change."
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Such an approach to the rule of law is not satisfied with the regime described by Hayek and Tamanaha. 16 It is not enough that civil government adhere to rules that are stable, general, and published. The rules must also accord with principles of justice or there is no rule of law.
Clearly, the formal and the substantive-sometimes called the "thin" and the "thick"
17 -versions of the rule of law differ significantly. The substantive adds to the formal the requirement that civil government secure further elements of justice. The substantive, then, builds upon the formal. Whether the rule of law itself should include such additional, substantive requirements is a matter of some dispute. On the one hand, a rule of law assuring that a civil government uniformly follow iniquitous positive law may not be so golden a met-wand. 18 [I]f the rule of law is the rule of the good law then to explain its nature is to propound a complete social philosophy. But if so the term lacks any useful function. We have no need to be converted to the rule of law just in order to discover that to believe in it is to believe that good should triumph.
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To define the rule of law to include human rights and democracy, Professor Tamanaha remarks, "smacks of stuffing the meaning of the rule of law with contestable normative presuppositions to produce a desired or presupposed outcome which is then imposed on everyone by definitional fiat." 22 However that may be, it is enough for the purposes of this article to emphasize that the substantive definitions of the rule of law incorporate the formal as well. Consequently, if a legal system fails to meet the standards of the formal version of the rule of law, it fails to meet the standards of the substantive version also.
Furthermore, when it comes to including human rights in the substantive version of the rule of law, the very definition of the rule of law may make of it something out of reach. If, as this article argues, a civil government implementing a broad spectrum of human rights courts violating the formal version of the rule of law, the substantive version in this context approaches an oxymoron. How convenient, then, for regimes that slight the rule of law to hide behind a definition of the rule of law that itself helps excuse their violations. But if guaranteeing human rights may put the rule of law at risk, apart from the rule of law there can be little security for human rights. However generous a government's law The very definition of the rule of law makes its universal importance obvious. And of late, "[t]he concept is suddenly everywhere-a venerable part of Western political philosophy enjoying a new run as a rising imperative of the era of globalization."
24 Brooks has observed that promotion of the rule of law commands the support of three (nonexclusive) groups involved in the quest for development: the investment community, human rights activists, and those concerned with security. 25 There may be reason to doubt that the rule of law itself is so powerful a tool of development. 26 All told, however, evidence demonstrates that the rule of law does in fact foster economic development at the least.
27
If the rule of law is important to development, East Africa is in sore need of the rule of law. Africa generally still awaits sound development. 28 At the same time, and likely as a cause of its underdevelopment, Africa generally still awaits institutions effectively supporting the rule of law.
29 Official corruption-a thing at odds with the rule of law-is endemic.
30 South Sudan, for example, has seen billions of dollars looted from its treasury by senior officials. 31 The law does not Rather, "many Africans view their present legal and judicial institutions as alien impositions designed for the benefit of the ruling elites." 33 This alienation from law and civil government, exacerbated by the ethnic and religious diversity in Africa, 34 offers its own challenge to the rule of law:
Citizens must see the law as an instrument that they can use to deal effectively with everyday problems, including organizing their lives and peacefully resolving conflicts, including those that arise from trade and other forums of free exchange. If, however, citizens view the laws and institutions as "alien" impositions, used by the political elites to oppress and exploit them, they are more likely to refuse to recognize these laws, let alone obey them. Within such a context, compliance becomes very difficult-the police and other enforcement agencies may be totally overwhelmed and simply unable to perform their constitutionally assigned functions, effectively allowing society to degenerate into chaos and violence.
35
With civil government detached from actual governance, the rule of law can have no real life. Law must truly regulate the relationship between a civil government and its people for the rule of law to exist. A state of civil lawlessness is not the rule of law, however much what passes for the institutions of civil government may by themselves accord with the law. Playing a game according to the rules does nothing to bring rules to spectators. Moreover, if government actors in East Africa do not respect the reach of the law, neither will others. Such a compound and mutually reinforcing breach in the rule of law must frustrate the development East Africa sorely needs. Part I of this article has presented a general treatment of the rule of law and a brief observation on the special challenges and needs of East Africa regarding the rule of law. Part II similarly will present a general treatment of human rights and then a brief observation on how they stand in East Africa. The parts share unhappy parallels.
The cause of human rights is no less celebrated these days than that of the rule of law. In fact, recent years have seen "the development of human rights as a kind of world religion."
36 Not that human rights are wholly new-fangled:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness-That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among Men . . . .
37
What is new, however, is the breadth of rights now generally thought to be included in the list of human rights, specifically rights that civil government supply basic human needs rather than rights that civil government forbear to injure human beings.
To be sure, the very existence of civil government is to supply a basic human need. The Declaration of Independence says as much. Civil government exists to secure civil justice or, in the words of the Declaration, "to secure" "unalienable Rights." But traditionally, though civil government was to secure rights, no one was understood to have a right that the civil government do so. 38 Rather, rights as against civil government limited its power as it went about doing justice and securing 36 rights. Political and legal history account for the development of such rights against the abuses of civil government, with government threats to liberty providing the impetus for the legal recognition of rights to set limits to government power. 39 Armed with legal rights, the subjects of civil government could enlist the institutions of the law-courts above all-to protect themselves against the all-too-likely trespasses of civil government.
These traditionally recognized rights against improper acts of the civil government are called "negative rights."
40 They are negative because they fundamentally call upon the civil government not to act.
There is a thin and confusing line between government action and inaction, but a negative right is one that can always be satisfied by inaction of some kind (even if it may also alternatively be satisfied by a government action), while a positive right cannot be satisfied by inaction and intrinsically requires government action. 41 So, for example, rights against the deprivation of life, liberty, or property at the hands of the civil government are negative rights. They specify actions the civil government may not perform. They limit the power of civil government.
Not so the other major category of rights against civil government, the so called "positive rights. 42. Positive rights also go by the name of "second-generation" rights, this in distinction from negative "first-generation" rights and from "third-generation" rights to such things as a clean environment and community development. Positive and negative rights against civil government fundamentally differ from each other. At root, this difference rests upon a fundamental difference between the nature of positive and the nature of negative moral duties. Saint John Paul II explained:
In the case of the positive moral precepts, prudence always has the task of verifying that they apply in a specific situation, for example, in view of other duties which may be more important or urgent. But the negative moral precepts, those prohibiting certain concrete actions or kinds of behavior as intrinsically evil, do not allow for any legitimate exception. They do not leave room, in any morally acceptable way, for the "creativity" of any contrary determination whatsoever. Once the moral species of an action prohibited by a universal rule is concretely recognized, the only morally good act is that of obeying the moral law and of refraining from the action which it forbids.
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It is typical of negative duties that they may be categorical. It is typical of positive duties that likely they are not. Positive duties call for specifications and qualifications inessential to negative duties.
The situation is similar with positive rights against civil government. So, for example, a right to be employed requires that the state decide who is best suited for any particular position. 51 Or a right to health care may be guaranteed, but this right is to be situated in the context of given laws and practice, and may be limited by law. 52 Whereas negative rights may be absolute, positive rights generally are contingent.
[P]ositive rights are typically not just rights to have the state act but rights to have the state act effectively, i.e. rights to a result, such as the provision of water. But the future is always uncertain. Rainfall and climate may vary. Rules for action or inaction, the stuff of ordinary This quotation suggests another aspect of the difference between negative and positive rights. Rights typically are enforceable by some tribunal:
[R]ights in the full sense are legal entitlements, not just competing social interests or desires. So only judicial or quasi-judicial authorities (using reasoned elaboration of general norms to decide cases), and not legislatures (representing the will of the people in formulating general norms), are competent to decide the concrete weight to be given each right. rights] in that their enforcement calls for government actions with are not fully determined by those rights, which are subject to policy choices, amenable to criteria of expediency and exposed to public debate."). Certainly, there can exist against civil government positive rights that minimize this tentativeness and contingency. Think, for example, of a right that each citizen receive one dollar from the government every month. At least until the money runs out, fulfilling this right involves little tentativeness and contingency. The focus of this article, however, is positive rights of a very different sort: the sort of general rights to health, education, and welfare to be found in the international, constitutional, and statutory law of the nations of East Africa.
54. Stith, supra note 36, at 856. (noting that the German constitutional rights to protection against others is not as much legal as it is a call for protective legislation). Here lies an important distinction between a right and its remedy. A positive right might entail a negative remedy: the denial of a right to receive a dollar might be remedied by an order prohibiting the payer from striking the complainant from the list of payees. Likewise, a negative right might entail a positive remedy: the denial of the right not to be injured physically might be remedied by an order requiring the payment of damages. The point to be made, however, is that positive rights typically lack the categorical certainty of negative rights, whatever remedies might come into play.
56 Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
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Developing countries, with due regard to human rights and their national economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to nonnationals. 83 The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far [sic] as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. 84 82. See ICESCR, supra note 48, art. 2, para. 1 (emphasis added). 83. Id. para. 3 (emphasis added). 84. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added). In addition, as to "the right of everyone to education," id. art. 13, para. 1, and specifically the guarantee that "[p]rimary education shall be compulsory and available free to all," id. para. 2.a, the Covenant provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant which, at the time of becoming a Party, has not been able to secure in its metropolitan territory or other territories under its jurisdiction compulsory primary education, free of charge, undertakes, within two years to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for the progressive implementation, within a reasonable number of years, to be fixed in the plan, of the principle of compulsory education free of charge for all. Id. art. 14 (emphasis added). Compare with this provision the explanation the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights offers regarding the obligation imposed by article 2, paragraph 1: "In interpreting States' obligations under Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the ESC Committee states that, though a State need not achieve the full realization of socioeconomic rights immediately, it has an immediate duty to construct a program or action plan towards their realization." Udombana, supra note 31, at 167 (footnote omitted).
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63 Such a marked difference between the ICESCR and the ICCPR leaves little doubt of the fundamental distinction between negative and positive rights, and especially their quality as categorical or contingent.
Positive and negative rights are so distinct that there ought to be doubt whether positive rights should share the celebrity of negative rights. 85 Positive rights tend to be ineffective. 86 On the other hand, if actually fully implemented, they could work a radical social revolution that one suspects would lack genuine and widespread support.
87 Qualities such as these may justly raise the question whether positive rights are worth the stating. Perhaps more importantly, to provide for positive rights may well put negative rights at risk. If some rights are contingent, strictly unenforceable, and have the effect more of marking an interest than of setting forth a rule of law, perhaps all rights will be taken to do the same. Even if the law distinguishes positive rights from negative in an attempt to isolate the categories from each other, nevertheless, both categories comprise rights. Rights, therefore, do not inherently establish rules of law. They do not grant or secure protection safe from pragmatic balancing and economizing. "In short, the inclusion of enforceable positive rights in constitutions may destroy negative rights." 88 85. "In fact, no country places social rights in the same category as political or civil rights-the so-called negative rights." Pascal, supra note 53, at 865.
86. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 53, at 871 ("With respect to socioeconomic and group rights in particular, more rights on paper is associated with less respect for rights in practice."). "Our findings are modestly consistent with the view that positive rights are harder to uphold, and thus more likely to be violated, than negative rights." Id. nce a political system permits limits on the exercise of human rights by the political process, the risk of reducing rights to only one factor among many in a utilitarian calculus will quickly become a reality.") (footnote omitted); Sunstein, supra note 86, at 225:
As with the rule of law, the East African context for human rights presents special challenges. Constitutional provisions announcing protection for human rights-including positive human rights-may sweep broad indeed. 89 At the same time, actual protection may be weak,
If we look at the actual and proposed constitutions for Eastern Europe, we will find a truly dazzling array of social and economic rights. The Hungarian Constitution, for example, protects not merely the right to equal pay for equal work, but also the right to an income conforming with the quantity and quality of work performed. (Pause for a moment over what it would mean for the Hungarian Constitutional Court to take these provisions seriously). The Slovak Constitution right to a standard of living commensurate to each citizen's potential and that of society as a whole [sic] . It also includes the right to just pay. Almost all of the actual document and proposed drafts include the rights to recreation, to paid holidays, to food and shelter, to a minimum wage, and to much more. A chaotic catalogue of abstractions from the social welfare state coexists with the traditional rights to private property, free speech, and so no.
I think that this is a large mistake, possibly a disaster. It seems clear that Eastern Europe countries should use their constitutions principally to produce two things: (i) firm liberal rights-free speech, voting rights, protection against abuse of the criminal justice system, religious liberty, protection from and prevention of invidious discrimination, property and contract rights; (ii) and the preconditions for some kind of market economy. The endless catalogue of what I will be calling "positive rights," many of them absurd, threatens to undermine both of these important tasks. 89. See, e.g., Smith Otieno, Transformative Constitutionalism: Contextualizing Human Rights Application under the Constitution of Kenya 2010 17, (Dec. 15, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2439158. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, subscribed by all the nations of East Africa but for South Sudan, broadly secures both negative and positive rights, and that without distinction or qualification. So the right to liberty, property, and religion are secured along with the rights to work, health, and education on equal terms. African Charter on Human and People's Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, art. 6, 8, 14, 15, 17, 18 (Jun. 27, 1981) . "The Charter guarantees all categories of human rights equally." Udombana, supra note 31, at 143. Again, it seems impossible that such equality would not reduce the protection of negative rights to that necessarily suited to positive, with consequences for the rule of law not difficult to predict. That South Sudan has not yet agreed to the Charter does not indicate its dislike of general positive rights. For example, its constitution especially for positive human rights. 90 In South Sudan, for example, a generous bill of rights appealing to Western constituencies stands alongside a constitution with structural provisions that establish a dominating national executive power equipped with prerogative more than enough to compromise any rights. 91 It may well be true of East African civil governments that an inability to provide the services promised by positive rights leads to the formal government affirmation of those very positive rights:
Already ashamed at being poor and backward, a state may sense that it may never have the means fully to supply all positive rights, or even just the right to water. Such a government may seek to prove its sincere intentions by abject apologies and repeated confessions of absolute faith in human rights, and wholesale surrender to the demands of the authorities claiming to articulate those rights. 92 Furthermore, the fear that providing positive rights might harm the protection of negative rights sadly may be well warranted in East Africa. The push for development in Africa has led its proponents to advance the claim of positive rights at the expense of negative rights, rights portrayed as "bourgeois" and costly to the masses, impeding the development desperately required for the public good. 93 The state of human rights in East Africa appears none too good, no thanks to the inclusion of positive provides, "Every citizen has the right to have access to decent housing. As we have seen, the civil governments of East Africa face daunting challenges as they aspire to secure both the rule of law and a wide range of human rights. Each of these aspirations brings with it challenges of its own. More daunting still, however, are the challenges owing to the tension between these aspirations. The very commitment to securing a wide range of human rights contributes to the difficulty of securing the rule of law.
Among the rights civil governments in East Africa pledge themselves to secure are broad positive rights, rights that oblige the governments by law to supply such goods as health, education, employment, and housing. 94 The contingencies and qualifications entailed in these rights distinguish them from negative rights and yet, as explained above, at the same time may present a threat to negative rights. 95 These factors likewise present a threat to the rule of law.
One way to understand the threat positive rights present to the rule of law rests upon the fact, already noted, 96 that positive, unlike negative rights, 97 typically embody guaranteed results and not simply rules proscribing or prescribing acts. Positive rights broadly are "consequentialist," and therefore "highly indeterminate. The universal consensus in any event seems to be that general positive rights are not justiciable after the usual fashion. After proposing, analyzing, and applying a subtle grid for understanding positive rights, distinguishing weak and strong rights and, separately, weak and strong remedies, Tushnet concludes, "Yet, in the end, maintaining the credibility of both courts and constitutions that contain social welfare rights might require that social welfare rights be nonjusticiable." Tushnet, supra note 99, at 1919.
100. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
adjudication," 101 using "polycentric" to refer to a complex problem, the resolution of which has complex repercussions, all interrelated much like the strands of a spider web. 102 Instead of adjudication, legislation or administration are the proper tools to be used by civil government to resolve polycentric problems. 103 Fuller's discussion of polycentricity has still more to offer for the present discussion. Even if the sources creating positive rights against civil government recognize that such rights ought not to be enforced by courts, labeling the interests they create "rights" presents a distinct problem.
A right is a demand founded on a principle-a principle regarded as appropriately controlling the relations of two parties. Now it is characteristic of a polycentric relationship that the relations of individual members to one another are not controlled by principles peculiar to those relations, just as it is impossible to build a bridge by establishing distinct principles governing the angle of every pair of girders. So in a baseball team, no one has a "right" to left field, or at least, no one ought to.
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And so the problem comes with casting positive rights as "rights," whether for courts or for other governmental institutions. For the law to label positive rights "rights" at all, causes rights to become something less than categorical expressions of a legal relation. It degrades rights into interests.
Beyond this effect, however, if rights become interests what consequences follow for the rule of law? (Indeed, what consequences follow for law itself if rights, the creation of rules of law, become interests? What becomes of rules if they sketch interests instead of fixing rights?)
Whether or not positive rights are for courts to enforce or instead become the business of some other institution of civil government, 69 creating positive rights affects the health of the rule of law. For one thing, keeping the enforcement of positive rights from the courts does not automatically insulate the rule of law from the effects of positive rights. How the administrative state-the alternative enforcer of positive rights-possibly may preserve the rule of law is a vexing question.
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Also vexing is the question whether any state given to securing positive rights may exist within the framework of the rule of law.
The rule of law demands that the law fundamentally comprise rules.
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The question arises, then, whether a civil government can secure broad positive rights within a system of rules. 107 In words regarding general economic planning by civil government, but precisely appropriate to supplying general positive rights, Hayek wrote:
The planning authority cannot confine itself to providing opportunities for unknown people to make whatever use of them they like. It cannot tie itself down in advance to general and formal rules which prevent arbitrariness. It must provide for the actual needs of people as they arise and then choose deliberately between them. It must constantly decide questions which cannot be answered by formal principles only, and, in making these decisions, it must set up distinctions of merit between the needs of different people. 107. If the rule of law operates effectively only under the vigilance of the ruled, there is at least one other question on the compatibility of positive rights with the rule of law: " [T] here is a danger that the man in the street still comes to look at the state-source of so many of his most valued expectations-with a new affection that undermines the healthy suspicion with which the sturdy citizen of a free society should regard officialdom and all its works." Jones, supra note 9, at 146.
108. HAYEK, supra note 5, at 113.
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Africa. 127 Of no help whatsoever in this situation is the deleterious complication brought by positive rights, with the further strain it places on the rule of law, especially where the positive rights drive a deeper wedge between the law and the actual acts of civil government.
128
In fact, for East African civil governments to grant broad positive human rights may be the move precisely contrary to securing the rule of law. Granting such rights is likely "only [to] provide a veneer of legitimacy," 129 distracting attention from the "structural constitutionalism" that East Africa needs, 130 and that in fact would bolster the rule of law. A corrupt political elite, unchallenged by an effective political dissent, could hide under such a veneer while taking advantage of the very weakening of the rule of law that the grant of positive rights produces. This move could only exacerbate the corruption that itself also undermines the rule of law. At the same time, such a situation further increases the power of those elites, entrenching all the more the forces opposed to the rule of law. All this, in cultures given to adulating political leaders and entrusting them with vast power. 131 East Africa, then, is positioned to suffer most from the unhappy effects upon the rule of law that positive human rights against civil government brings.
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